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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Ralph Pultrone appeals from a Judgment in a Criminal 
Case entered pursuant to our March 9, 1998 order 
remanding for resentencing following the government's 
appeal from the initial Judgment. Pultr one contends that 
there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for 
attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute; that 
the District Court erred in applying a pr eponderance of the 
evidence standard to determine the amount of cocaine for 
which he was responsible; and that he r eceived ineffective 
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to challenge 
the District Court's application of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard. Because we are convinced that Pultrone 
waived each of these allegations of error when he failed to 
pursue a direct appeal from the initial Judgment, we will 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
On June 19, 1996 a federal grand jury retur ned a 
superseding indictment, charging Pultr one with one count 
of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute 
and one count of attempted possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C.S 846. 
 
In September 1996 a jury convicted Pultrone of 
attempted possession; he was found not guilty on the 
conspiracy count. At the sentencing hearing on April 2, 
1997, the District Court rejected Pultr one's contention that 
he was responsible for only four ounces of cocaine and 
found that Pultrone had attempted to possess one kilogram 
of the drug. Accordingly, the Court assigned Pultrone a 
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base offense level of 26 in criminal history category II and 
sentenced him to a 76-month term of imprisonment, a 
sentence which fell below the midpoint of the applicable 
Guidelines range. 
 
On April 4, 1997, the government filed a motion to 
correct sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c), requesting 
that the District Court resentence Pultr one to the statutory 
minimum prison term mandated by 21 U.S.C.S 841(b)(1)(B).1 
A hearing on the motion was set for May 6, 1997. On April 
10, 1997, Pultrone filed a notice of appeal. 
 
On May 2, 1997, the government requested that the 
hearing on its Rule 35(c) motion be canceled because the 
seven-day period for decision specified in the rule had 
expired. On the same day, the governmentfiled a notice of 
cross-appeal contending only that the District Court 
committed clear error in failing to sentence Pultrone to the 
ten-year statutory minimum term of imprisonment. 
Pultrone voluntarily withdrew his appeal. 
 
We considered the government's appeal and agreed that 
the District Court should have sentenced Pultr one in 
accordance with the provisions of section 841(b)(1)(B). In 
the Judgment filed in March 1998, we dir ected "that the 
judgment of the . . . District Court entered April 3, 1997, be 
. . . vacated and the cause . . . remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion." United States v. 
Pultrone, No. 97-1327 (3d Cir. Mar ch 9, 1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This section provides, in relevant part as follows: 
 
       (B) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section 
       involving-- 
 
       (ii) 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a 
       detectable amount of -- 
 
       (II) cocaine . . . 
 
       such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which 
       may not be less than 5 years. . . . If any person commits such a 
       violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has 
       become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of 
       imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years. . . . 
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On June 9, 1998, the District Court resentenced Pultrone 
to a 120-month term of imprisonment in accor dance with 
our order. This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
In its brief, the government argues that because Pultrone 
failed to pursue the allegations of error raised here "when 
he first filed a direct appeal in 1997,[we are] without 
jurisdiction to review [those] argument[s] now." We agree. 
Each of these allegations of error could and should have 
been raised in that direct appeal; because Pultrone 
voluntarily withdrew the appeal, he failed to preserve these 
issues. "By withdrawing his [initial] notice of appeal, 
[Pultrone] has waived his right to appeal issues conclusively 
established by that judgment, in this case his conviction on 
count [two] of the indictment[,]" and the District Court's 
calculation of the amount of cocaine attributable to him. 
United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 434, 438 (10th Cir. 
1990). 
 
At resentencing, the action taken by the District Court 
reflected only our direction that the statutory minimum 
sentence be imposed; because Pultrone abandoned his 
appeal, no other aspect of his conviction or sentence was at 
issue. In this circumstance, "[t]he grant of remand on 
appeal does not reopen the order appealed from; instead, 
remand commences a new proceeding which will ultimately 
terminate in another final order ." Id. at 437-38 (citing 15 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 3901, at 1 (Supp. 1990)). We will not revisit 
here allegations of error which wer e conclusively 
determined by the original Judgment. 
 
Our conclusion with respect to Pultrone's allegation that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel is similar. As a 
general matter, we do not entertain claims r elating to 
ineffective assistance of counsel on dir ect appeal. United 
States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566 (3d Cir . 1996). To the 
extent that this issue might have been appropriate for 
evaluation on direct appeal under the narr ow exception 
described in United States v. Headley, 923 F .2d 1079, 1083 
(3d Cir. 1991), this issue, too, was waived when Pultrone 
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abandoned his original appeal. Any claim which Pultr one 
may have based on ineffective assistance of counsel must 
be raised under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.S 2255. 
 
III. 
 
Because Pultrone has waived each of the allegations of 
error raised here, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
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